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ABSTRACT
Wage inequality between education groups in the United States has increased substantially since
the early 1980s. The relative number of college-educated workers has also increased dramatically
in the postwar period. This paper presents a uniﬁed framework where the dynamics of both skill
accumulation and wage inequality arise as an equilibrium outcome driven by measured investment-
speciﬁc technological change. Working through equipment-skill complementarity and endogenous
skill accumulation, the model does well in capturing the steady growth in the relative quantity of
skilled labor during the postwar period and the substantial rise in wage inequality after the early
1980s. Based on the calibrated model, we examine the quantitative eﬀects of some hypothetical
tax-policy reforms on skill accumulation, wage inequality, and welfare.
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In the postwar period, the U.S. economy has experienced steady growth in per capita income,
accompanied by substantial changes in income inequality. As shown in Figure 1, income inequality
measured by the relative wage of college-educated workers (i.e., college wage premium) increased
in much of the 1960s, then declined modestly in the 1970s, and has since increased substantially
starting in the early 1980s. In the meantime, the number of skilled workers (e.g., those with college
degrees) has steadily grown relative to the number of unskilled workers (e.g., those with high school
diplomas), as is evident in Figure 2. Understanding potential causes of the observed dynamics
in wage inequality and skill accumulation is of great interest to both academic economists and
policy makers.
The literature on wage inequality is large and growing. Most studies attribute the dynamics
of wage inequality to skill-biased technological change (SBTC). One possible mechanism through
which SBTC may a®ect wage inequality is proposed by Katz and Murphy (1992). Based on a
simple supply and demand framework, they argue that, if there is a constant secular trend in
SBTC, then the increase in the relative supply of skilled workers in the 1970s associated with the
baby boom generation leads to a temporary fall in inequality, which, before moving back to its
secular trend, is bound to increase at an accelerated rate (see also Bound and Johnson, 1992). It
is unclear, however, what drives the trend in SBTC. Acemoglu (1998) proposes that SBTC can
be endogenous and can respond to the market size for skilled workers. As the relative supply of
skilled workers increases, there will be a larger market size and more monopoly rents for skill-
complementary technologies. This provides a greater incentive for innovating ¯rms to upgrade
the productivity of skilled workers. As a result, the skill premium initially falls and then rises.1
Most studies in the SBTC literature do not examine the quantitative contributions of the un-
derlying mechanisms that may drive wage inequality. Yet, to understand the driving mechanisms
of the changes in inequality and other labor market phenomena, \it is necessary to formulate
dynamic models that can quantitatively include the main alternative explanations so that one
can measure the impact of each one of them" (Eckstein and Nagyp¶ al, 2004, p. 26).
In an important contribution, Krusell et al. (2000, henceforth KORV) build a quantitative
framework to study the evolution of wage inequality. They show that, if capital equipments
are more complementary to skilled workers than to unskilled workers (e.g., Griliches, 1969), then
1Other theories on wage inequality include, for example, openness to international trade, changes in the union-
ization rate, and changes in real minimum wages. A general consensus is that SBTC theories provide a more
compelling story than these other theories. For a survey of this literature, see, for example, Acemoglu (2002) and
Aghion (2002).
2variations in the quantities of input factors help account for much of the observed changes in college
wage premium in the post-war U.S. economy. They interpret equipment-skill complementarity
as a form of SBTC. They further suggest that the observed changes in capital equipments can
be attributable to investment-speci¯c technological change in the spirit of Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krusell (1997, henceforth GHK). The study by KORV (2000) is particularly important from a
macroeconomic perspective because it relates the driving forces of the relative demand for skilled
workers and skill premium to input factors that can be explicitly measured.
A common feature of these SBTC-based theories | including KORV (2000) | is that tech-
nological change drives wage inequality through a®ecting the relative demand for skilled workers,
taking as given the relative supply of skilled workers.2 In the current paper, we would like to turn
the question around and ask: What quantitative framework helps account for the dynamics of
both skill accumulation and wage inequality, taking as given some measures of SBTC? In other
words, we would like to build a quantitative model with endogenous skill accumulation (instead
of taking the supply of skills as given), and to examine whether the observed changes in wage
inequality and the relative quantity of skilled workers can arise as an equilibrium outcome driven
by measured technological change.
For this purpose, we build a general equilibrium model with vintage capital, in which pro-
duction of capital equipments becomes increasingly e±cient over time (as in GHK, 1997). To
examine the quantitative e®ects of such capital-embodied (or investment-speci¯c) technological
change on the equilibrium dynamics of wage inequality and skill accumulation, we assume that
capital equipments are more complementary to skilled workers than to unskilled workers (as in
KORV, 2000), and that skill accumulation requires scarce resources and time (as in Ben-Porath,
1967; Trostel, 1993). With reasonable parameter values, we ¯nd that the model driven solely
by measured investment-speci¯c technological change is able to account for much of the steady
growth in the relative quantity of skilled labor in the postwar U.S. economy, and the model does
well in replicating the substantial rise in wage inequality after the early 1980s. Further, we ¯nd
2There are a few notable exceptions. For instance, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) develop and estimate
an overlapping generations (OLG) model with heterogenous skills, endogenous (once-for-all) schooling choice, and
post-school on-the-job investment to study college wage premium and skill formation. For their purpose, they
approximate SBTC by a trend estimated from an aggregate technology, rather than using direct measures, such
as that based on observed changes in the relative price of equipments. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), on the
other hand, emphasize the role of declining prices of producer durables and equipments in explaining the rise in
wage inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth. Unlike KORV (2000), both of these studies abstract
from capital-skill complementarity. For a more recent quantitative study of the changes in college wage premium
and college enrollment rate, see He (2006), who constructs an OLG model that incorporates demographic change,
investment-speci¯c technological change, and capital-skill complementarity.
3that investment-speci¯c technological change in our model accounts for about 52% of the average
annual growth rate of output per hour during the postwar period, which is close to the ¯nding in
GHK (1997), who abstract from equipment-skill complementarity and skill accumulation.
Our model contains a simple mechanism that propagates the investment-speci¯c technological
change (denoted by q) to generate the observed patterns in skill accumulation and wage inequality.
As q grows over time, the relative price of capital equipments falls, which encourages investment
in new equipments. Given equipment-skill complementarity, the expectation that the stocks of
equipments will rise in the future provides incentive for increased investment in skill accumulation,
since increases in equipments would raise the marginal productivity of skilled workers and lower
the marginal productivity of unskilled workers and thereby drive up the skill premium. Of course,
the increase in the relative quantity of skilled labor dampens the rise in the skill premium. With
plausible equipment-skill complementarity and a calibrated skill accumulation process, the model
is able to deliver both the steady growth in the relative quantity of skilled labor during the postwar
period and the substantial rise in wage inequality after the early 1980s.
An implication of the model's mechanism is that, not only changes in q, but other factors
that can raise the stocks of capital equipments can also raise wage inequality. To investigate
this possibility, we present a counterfactual experiment based on the calibrated model. In the
experiment, we lower the capital income tax rate from 39:7% to 0 in the spirit of the optimal
Ramsey taxation literature (e.g., Chamley, 1986), and we examine the e®ects of this capital-
income tax reduction on skill accumulation and wage inequality. When we eliminate capital
income taxes, we adjust the labor income tax rate to keep the present value of the tax revenue
unchanged. We assume that the same time series for q drives equilibrium dynamics before and
after the tax reform.3 We also examine the e®ects of the tax reform on welfare, which is measured
by a consumption equivalence in the spirit of Lucas (1987). We ¯nd that lowering the capital tax
rate to zero leads to a substantial increase in the stock of capital equipments and in the relative
quantity of skilled labor. The tax reform also creates a sizable increase in welfare. Yet, perhaps
surprisingly, its e®ect on wage inequality is small.
The reduction in capital income taxes works through three channels to a®ect wage inequality.
First, the reduction in capital taxes raises the stocks of capital equipments and, with equipment-
skill complementarity, raises the relative marginal productivity of skilled workers as well. Second,
related to the ¯rst, the reduction in capital taxes encourages skill accumulation and thereby lowers
the skill premium, since the relative supply of skilled workers increases. Third, to keep the present
3More accurately, we are comparing two economies with the same q series (and the same tax revenue), but with
di®erent factor-income tax rates.
4value of tax revenue unchanged, the reduction in capital taxes requires an increase in the labor
income tax rate. Raising the labor income tax lowers the bene¯t of skill accumulation since skilled
labor income is taxed at a higher rate; it also lowers the opportunity cost of time investment for
skill accumulation. However, since goods investment for skill accumulation is not tax deductible,
the higher labor tax reduces only part of the cost of skill accumulation. The total cost is thus
reduced by less than the reduction in the bene¯t, and skill accumulation is discouraged (e.g.,
Trostel, 1993). As such, raising the labor income tax tends to increase the skill premium. Under
calibrated parameters, the net e®ect of the capital-tax reduction on wage inequality is small.
In a second counterfactual experiment, we examine the e®ectiveness of two (revenue-neutral)
policy changes that aim at reducing income inequality. One such policy is to raise the progressive-
ness of labor income taxes, and the other is to provide subsidies for human-capital investment.
Increasing the progressiveness of labor taxes, although mechanically reduces the after-tax skill
premium, is not e®ective in reducing wage inequality. Such a policy change discourages skill ac-
cumulation and thus increases the scarcity of skilled labor. Further, by lowering the average skill
level, a more progressive labor taxation system can lead to a decline in average productivity and
in°ict a substantial welfare loss. In contrast, subsidizing skill accumulation can e®ectively reduce
the skill premium through raising the relative quantity of skilled workers, and the policy change
is welfare-improving.
In what follows, we present the model in Section 2, describe the calibration and solution
methods in Section 3, discuss the main results in Section 4, present the counterfactual policy
experiments in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. In an appendix, we describe the data sources
and computation methods.
2 The Model
We now present a general equilibrium model with vintage capital. The model features (i)
investment-speci¯c technological change, under which production of new capital equipments be-
comes increasingly e±cient over time; (ii) equipment-skill complementarity, under which capital
equipments are more complementary to skilled workers than to unskilled workers; and (iii) en-
dogenous skill accumulations.
2.1 The Economic Environment
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by a large number of identical, in¯nitely lived
households. The representative household is formed by a continuum of workers with a unit
5measure, who supply inelastically to the market one unit of time. In each period, a fraction of
workers is skilled and the rest is unskilled. There exists a technology to transform unskilled labor
into skilled labor, and such transformation requires both time and goods as inputs. The household
derives utility from consumption of a ¯nal good, which is produced by a large number of ¯rms
using skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital equipments, and capital structures. The ¯nal good is
also used for accumulations of physical capitals (equipments and structures) and human capital
(skilled labor). A government collects revenues through proportional taxes on labor incomes and
capital incomes, and rebates the proceeds to the representative household through lump-sum
transfers. All agents have perfect foresight.
The representative household has a life-time discounted utility function
1 X
t=0
¯t c1¡¾
t
1 ¡ ¾
; (1)
where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, ct is consumption, and ¾ > 0 is a relative risk
aversion parameter.
The representative ¯rm produces the ¯nal good, with the production function given by
yt = ~ kµ
st
h
¹(zt~ ut)º + (1 ¡ ¹)[¸~ k
Á
et + (1 ¡ ¸)(zt~ st)Á]º=Á
i 1¡µ
º ; (2)
where yt denotes output, ~ kst denotes input of capital structures, ~ ket denotes input of capital equip-
ments, ~ ut denotes input of unskilled workers, ~ st denotes input of skilled workers, and zt denotes a
(neutral) labor-augmenting technological change. The parameter µ 2 (0;1) measures the elasticity
of output with respect to capital structures, and the parameters Á and º determine the elasticities
of substitution between equipments and skilled labor and between the skill-equipment composite
and unskilled labor, respectively. If Á < º < 1, then equipments are more complementary to
skilled workers than to unskilled workers and the production technology features equipment-skill
complementarity in the spirit of KORV (2000).
Physical capitals depreciate over time. Denote by ±s and ±e the depreciation rates for capital
structures and equipments, respectively. Then, the laws of motion for these capital stocks are
given by
ks;t+1 = (1 ¡ ±s)kst + ist; (3)
and
ke;t+1 = (1 ¡ ±e)ket + ietqt; (4)
where we assume that new investments in capital structures ist and in capital equipments iet
are both non-negative and kst and ket are the current stocks of such capitals. We interpret the
term qt in (4), in the spirit of GHK (1997), as investment-speci¯c technological change (ISTC)
6that enhances the productivity of newly formed capital equipments. One can also interpret 1=qt
as the relative price of new capital equipments, which, according to the evidence provided by
GHK (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002), declined for most of the postwar period, and the
decline has accelerated since the early 1980s. We will discuss more about qt in the calibration
section.4
We now describe the skill accumulation technology. The representative household consists of
a continuum of workers with a unit measure, who supply inelastically one unit of time to the
market. In each period t, a fraction st 2 (0;1) of workers is skilled and a fraction ut = 1 ¡ st
is unskilled. Denote iht ¸ 0 the goods invested in skill accumulation and et 2 (0;1) the fraction
of time of the unskilled workers used for skill transformation. The technology that transforms
unskilled labor into skilled labor is given by
st+1 = (1 ¡ ´)st + B
·µ
iht
zt
¶®
[et(1 ¡ st)]1¡®
¸»
; (5)
where ´ 2 [0;1] measures the depreciation rate of existing skills and ®, », and B are parameters
characterizing the production technology of new skills. In particular, ® 2 (0;1) measures the
relative importance of goods input vs. time input, » > 0 measures the returns to scale, and B > 0
measures the e±ciency of the skill transformation technology. We divide the goods input iht by
the level of the neutral technological change zt to keep the model consistent with balanced growth,
under which the investment-speci¯c technological change qt settles down at a constant level while
the neutral technological change zt grows at a constant rate.
Some studies assume that e®ective time is the only input in human capital production (e.g.,
Heckman, 1976; Haley, 1976); some other studies assume that goods are the only input (e.g.,
Stokey, 1996). We follow Ben-Porath (1967) and Trostel (1993) and assume that skill accumulation
requires both time and goods as inputs. This speci¯cation has important implications for studying
the e®ects of taxation (as we do in the policy experiments below).5 As in Ben-Porath (1967) and
Trostel (1993), we impose a unitary elasticity of substitution between goods and time invested in
skill accumulation and we assume that the production of new skills exhibits decreasing returns
to scale (i.e., » < 1) to ensure an interior solution. Unlike Ben-Porath (1967) and Trostel (1993),
our speci¯cation here implies that adding skilled workers also subtracts from the unskilled.
4Our model can be reinterpreted as a two-sector model, in which one sector produces consumption good and
capital structures, and the other produces equipments. Each sector is subject to a sector-speci¯c productivity shock.
Then, under some conditions (e.g., perfect factor mobility and identical capital-labor ratio across sectors), such a
two-sector model is isomorphic to the model used in our quantitative analysis. See also GHK (1997) for a similar
result in an environment with Cobb-Douglas technologies.
5We are grateful to two anonymous referees for suggesting the inclusion of both time and goods in the skill
transformation technology.
7The government collects tax revenues through proportional taxes on the household's capital
income and labor income. In calculating the tax base for capital income taxes, there is a depre-
ciation allowance. The government rebates tax revenues to the representative household through
lump-sum transfers, so that
¿k[(rst ¡ ±s)kst + (ret ¡ ±e=qt)ket] + ¿l(wstst + wutut(1 ¡ et)) = Tt; (6)
where ¿k and ¿l are the tax rates on capital income and labor income, rst and ret are the rental
rates on structures and equipments, wst and wut are the wage rates for skilled and unskilled
workers, and Tt is the lump-sum transfer.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
The representative household owns the physical capital (equipments and structures), which she
rents to the representative ¯rm at the competitive rental rates ret for equipments and rst for
structures. A fraction st of the members of the household supplies skilled labor to the ¯rm at a
competitive wage wst, a fraction ut(1 ¡ et) supplies unskilled labor to the ¯rm at a competitive
wage wut, and the remaining members of the household (of measure utet) invest their time for
skill accumulation. The household takes the wage rates and the rental rates as given and chooses
consumption ct, investment in capital equipments iet, investment in capital structures ist, invest-
ment in human capital in terms of both goods iht and foregone time et to maximize the discounted
utility (1) subject to a sequence of budget constraints
ct + iet + ist + iht · (1 ¡ ¿l)(wstst + wut(1 ¡ et)(1 ¡ st))
+(1 ¡ ¿k)(retket + rstkst) + ¿k(±eket=qt + ±skst) + Tt; (7)
and the laws of motion (3), (4), and (5) for the physical capitals and the human capital, along
with non-negativity constraints on c, ie, is, ih, and et.
The ¯rm takes the wage rates and the rental rates as given, and chooses the quantities of
inputs f~ ket;~ kst; ~ ut; ~ stg to solve a pro¯t-maximizing problem
max¼ = yt ¡ wst~ st ¡ wut ~ ut ¡ ret~ ket ¡ rst~ kst; (8)
where the output yt is related to the inputs through the production function (2). As the production
technology exhibits constant returns and the ¯rm faces perfectly competitive markets, pro¯t is
zero in equilibrium.
A competitive equilibrium consists of a set of allocations ct, ke;t+1, ks;t+1, st+1, iet, ist, iht, and
et for the representative household; a set of allocations yt, ~ ket, ~ kst, ~ ut, and ~ st for the representative
¯rm, a set of prices ret, rst, wst, and wut, and a pro¯le of government policy f¿k;¿l;Tg, such that
81. Taking the prices and the policy as given, the household's allocations solve its utility maxi-
mizing problem.
2. Taking the prices and the policy as given, the ¯rm's allocations solve its pro¯t maximizing
problem.
3. The government budget is balanced in each period.
4. Markets for the input factors and for the ¯nal good clear so that
~ ket = ket; ~ kst = kst; ~ st = st; ~ ut = ut(1 ¡ et); st + ut = 1;
and
yt = ct + ist + iet + iht: (9)
2.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
We now characterize the equilibrium dynamics. The household's optimizing conditions can be
reduced to three intertemporal Euler equations with respect to the three forms of capital: struc-
tures, equipments, and skills and one intratemporal decision with respect to the time allocated
to skill accumulation.
The Euler equation for capital structures is given by
c¡¾
t = ¯c¡¾
t+1 [(1 ¡ ¿k)(rs;t+1 ¡ ±s) + 1]: (10)
The left-hand side of the equation gives the marginal utility loss of foregoing one unit of consump-
tion good to invest in capital structures in period t. The right-hand side of the equation gives
the present value of marginal-utility gain in period t + 1 from such investment, which equals the
after-tax return on capital structures. In equilibrium, the utility gain equals the utility loss.
The Euler equation for capital equipments is given by
c¡¾
t
qt
= ¯
c¡¾
t+1
qt+1
[(1 ¡ ¿k)(re;t+1qt+1 ¡ ±e) + 1]: (11)
This equation is similar to (10), except that the units need to be appropriately converted using
the relative price 1=qt for new equipments.
To help derive and interpret the Euler equation for skill accumulation, we de¯ne a function
f(iht;et;st) = B
·µ
iht
zt
¶®
(et(1 ¡ st))1¡®
¸»
;
where fiht =
@f
@iht > 0, fet =
@f
@et > 0, and fst =
@f
@st < 0. The Euler equation for skill accumulation
can then be written as
c¡¾
t
fiht
= ¯c¡¾
t+1
(
1 ¡ ´ + fst+1
fih;t+1
+ (1 ¡ ¿l)[ws;t+1 ¡ wu;t+1(1 ¡ et+1)]
)
: (12)
9To understand this equation, note that each unit of consumption good invested in skill accumula-
tion results in fiht units of new skills. In other words, 1=fiht measures the shadow price of newly
formed skills. The left-hand side of (12) then represents the period-t marginal utility loss from
investing goods for producing an additional unit of skilled labor. The right-hand side represents
the present value of the marginal utility gain from having this additional unit of skilled labor. In
particular, the utility gain consists of two components: (i) the remaining value of the skills after
taking into account of skill depreciation (´ > 0) and the reduction in the number of unskilled
workers available to be transformed into skilled workers (fs < 0), and (ii) the marginal increase in
the after-tax wage income for adding a unit of skilled labor (and thereby subtracting a unit from
the unskilled). In equilibrium, the utility gain and loss are equal, so that the household remains
indi®erent at the margin of the skill accumulation decisions.
The optimizing decision on the time invested for skill accumulation is given by
fet = fiht(1 ¡ ¿l)wut(1 ¡ st): (13)
This equilibrium relation re°ects that, at the margin, the household should remain indi®erent
between investing time versus investing goods in skill accumulation. Investing a marginal unit of
time produces fet units of skilled labor; alternatively, investing a marginal unit of consumption
goods produces fiht units of skilled labor. The time investment bears an opportunity cost equal
to the after-tax labor income of the unskilled workers. In equilibrium, the household is indi®erent
between these two alternative means of producing an additional unit of skilled labor.
The ¯rm's optimizing decisions equate the prices of input factors to their marginal products.
To simplify expressions, we de¯ne
~ yt =
h
¹(ztut(1 ¡ et))º + (1 ¡ ¹)(¸k
Á
et + (1 ¡ ¸)(ztst)Á)º=Á
i1=º
; (14)
so that the production function can be written as yt = kµ
st~ y1¡µ
t . The factor prices are given by
rst = µ
µ
~ yt
kst
¶1¡µ
; (15)
re = ¸(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¹)kµ
st~ y1¡µ¡º
t [¸k
Á
et + (1 ¡ ¸)(ztst)Á]
º
Á¡1k
Á¡1
et (16)
ws = (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¹)kµ
st~ y1¡µ¡º
t [¸k
Á
et + (1 ¡ ¸)(ztst)Á]
º
Á¡1z
Á
t s
Á¡1
t (17)
wu = (1 ¡ µ)¹kµ
st~ y1¡µ¡º
t (ut(1 ¡ et))º¡1zº
t : (18)
Denote by ¼st = wst
wut the skill premium. From equations (17) and (18), the skill premium is
given by
¼st =
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¸)
¹
"
¸
µ
ket
ztst
¶Á
+ (1 ¡ ¸)
#º¡Á
Á ·
ut(1 ¡ et)
st
¸1¡º
z
Á¡º
t : (19)
10If 1 > º > Á, then capital equipments are more complementary to skilled labor than to unskilled
labor. With such equipment-skill complementarity, we have
@¼s
@(ke=s)
> 0;
@¼s
@[s=(u(1 ¡ e))]
< 0:
In other words, the skill premium increases with the equipment-skill ratio (the equipment-skill
complementarity e®ect), and decreases with the skilled-unskilled ratio (the relative quantity ef-
fect).
To summarize, we have 12 equilibrium conditions, including the three Euler equations (10){
(12), the intratemporal decision on the time input for skill accumulation (13), the three capital
accumulation equations (3){(5), the four factor-price equations (15){(18), and the aggregate re-
source constraint (9). These equilibrium conditions jointly determine the equilibrium values of 12
variables fct;ist;iet;iht;et;ke;t+1;ks;t+1;st+1;ret;rst;wst;wutg1
t=0.
2.4 Balanced Growth
Since investment-speci¯c technological change qt is capital augmenting rather than labor aug-
menting, the model economy with a CES production function as the one in (2) would attain
balanced growth only if there is no secular growth in qt (e.g., Hornstein and Krusell, 2003). Of
course, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, as in GHK (1997), then balanced growth can
be attained even if qt grows at a constant rate. More formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The balanced growth path (BGP) in this economy cannot be achieved unless
there is no secular growth in the investment-speci¯c technological change or the elasticities of
substitution between input factors are unitary.
Proof: By contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose that the neutral technological
change zt stays constant. Suppose there were a BGP with a positive growth in the investment-
speci¯c technological change q. Along the BGP, the growth rates of y, ke, and ks, and the levels
of s and u are all constant. Let °x denote the growth rate of a variable x. Then, from the resource
constraint and the laws of motion of physical capital stocks, we have °y = °ks and °ke = °y + °q.
The production function yt = kµ
st~ y1¡µ
t implies that °y = °~ y, which leads to a contradiction because
°~ y is in general not a constant, as ke grows at a constant rate, while the levels of s, e, and u remain
constant on a BGP.
In the case with unitary elasticities of substitution between input factors (i.e., Cobb-Douglas
production function), there exists a BGP, as shown by GHK (1997). Q.E.D.
We do not consider the case with a Cobb-Douglas production function because it is inconsis-
tent with the evidence of equipment-skill complementarity; we do not restrict qt to be constant
11because we would like to examine the role of investment-speci¯c technological change (i.e., a time-
varying qt) in accounting for the observed dynamics in wage inequality and skill accumulation.
To isolate the role qt, we shut o® the neutral technological change by assuming that zt = 1 for
all t. In computing the equilibrium dynamics, we interpret the growth in the investment-speci¯c
technological change as a transition from some initial steady state to a new steady state, and we
focus on computing the transition dynamics of wage inequality and the relative quantity of skilled
labor in the economy where agents have perfect foresight about the future time path of qt.6
3 The Calibration and Solution Methods
We now describe our approach to calibrating the parameters to be used in our computation of
the transition dynamics.
The parameters to be calibrated include ¯, the subjective discount factor; ¾, the relative risk-
aversion parameter; µ, ¸, and ¹, which determine the income shares of capital structures, capital
equipments, and unskilled labor; Á and º, which determine the elasticities of substitution between
equipments and skilled labor and between the equipment-skill composite and unskilled labor; ±s,
±e, and ´, the depreciation rates of structures, equipments, and skills; B, ®, and », parameters
in the skill transformation technology; and ¿k and ¿l, the tax rates on capital and labor incomes.
The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
We set ¾ = 1:5, a standard value used in the literature. We follow GHK (1997) and set
µ = 0:13, ±s = 0:056, and ±e = 0:124. We set Á = ¡0:495 so that the elasticity of substitution
between capital equipments and skilled labor is about 0:67, which is the value estimated by
KORV (2000). Based on the estimation by Du®y et al. (2004), we set º = 0:79 as a benchmark.
Since the empirical literature provides a wide range of estimates for º (see Hamermesh, 1993),
we also consider some other values of º in our policy experiments, including the value of º =
0:401 estimated by KORV (2000). Heckman's (1976) estimates suggest that the returns to scale
parameter » varies in the range between 0:51 and 0:81. We set » = 0:7 as a benchmark value,
which lies within the range of Heckman's estimates and is also the value used by Stokey (1996).
6Since our focus is to examine to what extent the increases in the skill premium and the relative quantity of skilled
labor can be accounted for by the observed increase in qt (and its acceleration since the early 1980s), assuming perfect
foresight does not seem to lose much generality. Ideally, the model should be solved under rational expectations
with a stochastic process for qt. A di±culty with this approach is that, as we show in Proposition 1, a balanced
growth path does not exist in our model with a CES production function if qt contains a trend. Thus, the traditional
solution methods involving log-linearizing around a balanced growth path do not apply. Developing computational
techniques to solve nonlinear rational-expectations model without balanced growth remains an important challenge
for future research. In our view, this issue is important enough to deserve a separate investigation.
12In our policy experiments, we also consider some other values of » in the range between 0:5 and
0:8. According to Heckman's (1976) estimates, the rate of human capital depreciation ranges
from 0:04 to 0:09. We set ´ = 0:08, which is also the value used by Stokey (1996). We set the
average capital income tax rate to ¿k = 0:397, a value used by Domeji and Heathcote (2004), and
the average labor income tax rate to ¿l = 0:277, following the work by McGrattan (1994) and
Mendoza et al. (1994).
This leaves ¯ve parameters to be calibrated, including B, ®, ¯, ¸, and ¹. We assign values
to these parameters so that the initial steady state in the model matches ¯ve moment conditions
observed in the data in 1949.7 These ¯ve moment conditions are as follows:
1. The college wage premium (i.e., the average annual wage of college graduates relative to
that of high-school graduates) is 1.456 in 1949 (Census data).
2. The expenditure in skill accumulation as a fraction of GDP is about 1:8% in 1949 (Data
source: National Center for Educational Statistics, DES 2003).
3. The average capital-output ratio is 2.659 for the period between 1947 and 1949 (NIPA data).
4. The average income share of capital stock is 0.267 for the period between 1947 and 1949
(NIPA data).
5. The ratio of skilled labor (i.e., college graduates) to unskilled labor (i.e., high-school grad-
uates) is 0.288 in 1949 (Census data).
Table 1 reports the values of these ¯ve parameters required to match the ¯ve initial moment
conditions. There we have B = 0:349, ® = 0:60, ¯ = 0:988, ¸ = 0:491, and ¹ = 0:423.
To measure the investment-speci¯c technological change series qt, we rely on the study by
Cummins and Violante (2002), who construct a quality-adjusted time series of the price index
for 24 types of equipments and softwares during the period from 1947 to 2000, in the spirit of an
earlier study by Gordon (1990). Upon obtaining the price index for equipments and softwares, we
divide it by the price index of consumer non-durables and services reported in the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) to obtain a (quality-adjusted) relative price of new equipments and
softwares. The investment-speci¯c technological change (i.e., the qt series) is then the inverse of
this relative price. The resulting qt series is plotted in Figure 3. The ¯gure shows that qt has been
increasing for most of the postwar period, and its growth has accelerated since the early 1980s.
7We choose 1949 as the initial steady state, since our qt series constructed based on Cummins and Violante
(2002) appears fairly stable between 1947 and 1949.
13The average growth rate of qt was 3:45% for the period 1950-1980 and increased to 5:83% for the
period 1981-2000.
As we have discussed earlier, we interpret the growth in the ISTC during the period from 1949
to 2000 as part of a transition from some initial steady state to a new steady state, where the
ISTC becomes stable. To compute the transition dynamics, we assume that the growth rate of the
ISTC slows down linearly starting in year 2001, and reaches zero in 2050. To ensure convergence
to the ¯nal steady state, we further extend the (hypothetical) sample period for the ISTC series
to year 2108. This way, we obtain a time series for qt with a length of 160 years, consisting of
52 years of actual observations between 1949 and 2000 taken from Cummins and Violante (2002)
and 108 additional years for qt to settle down at a new steady state.8
To compute the transition dynamics in the model, we ¯rst solve for the initial steady state
and the ¯nal steady state given the values of the qt series in the initial and the ¯nal steady states.
Table 2 summarizes the solutions for some key variables in the initial steady state (with q1 = 1)
and compares these solutions with the corresponding moments in U.S. data (i.e., the values in
1949). The ¯rst ¯ve moment conditions in Table 2 match the data by construction. The model
does fairly well on the other two dimensions. The average consumption-output ratio in the model
is about 77%, which is close to the observed value of 81%; the ratio of capital equipments to
capital structures in the model is 0:56, which is not far from that in the data (0:64).9
Upon obtaining the solutions for the initial and the ¯nal steady states in the model, we
compute the transition dynamics using a non-linear solution methods in the spirit of Conesa and
Krueger (1999), Chen, _ Imrohoro¸ glu and _ Imrohoro¸ glu (2006), and He (2006). The details of the
solution algorithm are described in Appendix B.
4 Dynamic Implications of the Model
We now describe the equilibrium dynamics of wage inequality and the relative quantity of skilled
labor driven solely by the measured investment-speci¯c technological change. We compare the
model's predictions with the observations in the U.S. data.
8Our quantitative results are not sensitive to alternative assumptions about what happens to the ISTC after
2001. For instance, when we assume that the ISTC stops growing in 2010 (instead of 2050), we obtain almost
identical results.
9The equipment-structure ratio in the data is the average value for the period 1963-1992 taken from KORV
(2000). Ideally, we should compare the model's initial steady state value with the value in 1949 in the data.
Unfortunately, quality-adjusted data of capital equipments in 1949 are not available. As the relative productivity of
equipments has been rising since 1949, it is reasonable to believe that the equipment-structure ratio in 1949 should
be lower than the average value for 1963-1992, and therefore be closer to our model's prediction.
14Figure 4 plots the skill premium (in log units) generated from the model and that in the data
for the period between 1963 and 2000. The model does well in accounting for the substantial rise
in wage inequality since the early 1980s. In particular, wage inequality measured by the relative
wages of skilled workers in the U.S. economy has increased by about 19% between 1984 and 2000.
The model predicts an increase of 14%. The model fails to capture the earlier episodes in the
evolution of wage inequality, especially that in the 1970s. This is perhaps not surprising, since
other factors such as demographic changes associated with the baby boom generation, which we
do not model here, might also be driving the observed changes in wage inequality in the 1970s
(e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; He, 2006).10
Figure 5 plots the dynamics of the relative quantity of skilled labor predicted by the model and
that observed in the data. The model's prediction tracks the data surprisingly well for the entire
sample period from 1963 to 1996. The result here suggests that the observed secular increase in the
relative quantity of skilled labor can be mostly accounted for by investment-speci¯c technological
change.
Our model contains a simple mechanism that propagates the investment-speci¯c technological
change to generate the observed patterns in skill accumulation and wage inequality. As qt grows
over time, the relative price of capital equipments falls, which encourages the household to invest
in new equipments so that the stock of capital equipments grows over time. Because of equipment-
skill complementarity, the increase in the stock of equipments raises the marginal productivity of
skilled workers and lowers that of unskilled workers and thereby driving up the skill premium. As
such, the household ¯nds it optimal to invest more in human capital and the skilled-unskilled ratio
rises over time. Although the increase in the skilled-unskilled ratio dampens the rise in the skill
premium, the equipment-skill complementarity e®ect dominates. Under calibrated parameters,
our model predicts that both the skill premium and the skilled-unskilled ratio rise over time, as
in the data.11
10A main discrepancy between the model's predictions and the data seems to be the two spikes in the skill
premium predicted (incorrectly) by the model. The timing of these spikes appears to coincide with those in the qt
series (see Figure 3). It is not clear what drives the spikes in the qt series. The timing suggests that oil price shocks
in the 1970s may have been a contributing factor. High oil prices render some capital equipments obsolete, leading
to higher equipment investment and a higher equipment price. As the e®ects of oil shocks are expected to dissipate,
the price of equipments is expected to fall, and thus productivity of the equipment sector (i.e., qt) is expected to
rise after the oil shocks.
11In an unreported experiment, we examine the quantitative importance of endogenous skill accumulation for
capturing the trend in the skill premium. For this purpose, we consider an extreme case with » = 0, so that skill
accumulation is prohibitively costly and the equilibrium relative quantity of skilled labor is constant. In this case,
the model substantially overstates the trend in the skill premium: the skill premium rises by about 35% in the
15The propagation mechanism in the model implies that, as production of new equipments be-
comes more e±cient over time, the average labor productivity measured by output per hour grows
as well. GHK (1997) ¯nd that investment-speci¯c technological change accounts for about 58% of
the average annual growth rate in output per hour in the United States for the period 1954{1990.
Our model generalizes the model in GHK (1997) by incorporating equipment-skill complementar-
ity and endogenous human-capital accumulation. The presence of these new elements, however,
does not alter the main quantitative results obtained by GHK (1997). Our model driven solely
by investment-speci¯c technological change predicts that the average growth rate of output per
hour is 0:64% during the period 1954{1990, compared to 1:24% in the data. In other words,
investment-speci¯c technological change accounts for about 52% of the average growth in output
per hour observed in the U.S. economy.
Our model has also interesting implications for measured total factor productivity (TFP).
Since we assume a constant neutral technology in our model and the ISTC is the only source of
equilibrium dynamics, changes in output re°ects changes in measured input factors only. We can
thus measure TFP by the di®erence between actual GDP in the data and output in the model.
The TFP series so measured displays a productivity slowdown since the early 1980s: the average
annual growth rate of TFP was 2:38% for 1950-1979 and became lower at 1:09% for 1980-2000.
The slowdown in TFP growth coincides with the acceleration in the ISTC growth since the early
1980s, and it is a simple consequence of growth accounting: in the latter sample period, faster
growth in the ISTC leads to faster growth in input factors and thus a larger fraction of output
growth being accounted for by input growth.
To summarize, our results suggest that the ISTC can be an important source of growth in
average labor productivity and the acceleration in the ISTC growth since the early 1980s may
have contributed to the observed productivity slowdown. More importantly, our model accounts
for much of the steady growth in the relative quantity of skilled labor in the postwar U.S. economy,
and it does well in replicating the substantial rise in wage inequality since the early 1980s.
5 Tax Reforms and E±ciency-Inequality Trade-o®s
The dynamic behavior of wage inequality in our model is driven by two competing forces between
a \relative quantity e®ect" and an \equipment-skill complementarity e®ect." Thus, not only
investment-speci¯c technological change, but other factors that a®ect capital accumulation might
also a®ect wage inequality. In this section, we ¯rst illustrate this possibility by considering a
model for the period 1984-2000, but only 19% in the data for the same period. Thus, we need both equipment-skill
complementarity and endogenous skill accumulation to match the time path of the skill premium.
16counterfactual capital-income tax reform that encourages capital accumulation. We then examine
the e®ectiveness of some hypothetical tax policies that aim at reducing income inequality.12
5.1 Counterfactual Experiment I: Eliminating Capital Income Taxes
We now examine the quantitative e®ects of eliminating capital income taxes on wage inequality
and skill accumulation. When we eliminate capital income taxes, we adjust labor income taxes
so that the present value of the tax revenues during the entire transition period remains the same
as in the benchmark economy. Since a zero capital income tax is consistent with the Ramsey
optimal tax policy (e.g., Chamley, 1986), we also calculate the welfare gains from the tax reform.
In our quantitative experiment, we compare wage inequality and welfare in two economies,
both driven by the same investment-speci¯c technological change (i.e., our qt series). The two
economies are identical except for their tax policies. One economy is our benchmark model, which
has positive tax rates on both capital and labor, with ¿k = 39:7% and ¿l = 27:7%. The other
economy has a zero tax on capital, but a higher tax on labor so that the present value of the total
tax revenue during the transition period remains the same as in our benchmark economy. The
required labor income tax rate in this latter economy is ~ ¿l = 32:83%.13
Figure 6 plots the wage inequality for the two economies with di®erent tax policies. Apparently,
eliminating capital income taxes raises wage inequality modestly. For the period of our interest,
1949{2000, wage inequality in the economy with a zero capital income tax is on average 3:3%
higher than that in the benchmark economy. The e®ects of the tax reform on wage inequality
also vary with time. Beginning in the early 1980s, as the growth in the investment-speci¯c
technological change accelerates, the tax reform has a larger impact on wage inequality than in
the earlier periods.
As wage inequality measured by the skill premium depends on both the equipment-skill ratio
and the skilled-unskilled ratio (see equation (19)), it is instructive to examine the e®ects of the
capital tax reform on these two determinants. Figure 7 plots the e®ects of eliminating capital
income taxes on the relative quantity of skilled labor (the top panel) and on the equipment-skill
ratio (the bottom panel). The ¯gure reveals that the reduction in capital taxes raises both the
relative quantity of skilled labor and the equipment-skill ratio. The gap between the skilled-
unskilled ratio before and after the capital tax reduction appears to become larger over time. The
12For some recent quantitative studies about the e®ects of changes in tax policies on wage inequality and welfare,
see, for example, Blankenau (1999) and Blankenau and Ingram (2002). A key di®erence between these studies and
ours is that we emphasize the role of investment-speci¯c technological change in driving wage inequality.
13In calculating the present value, the discount factor that we use is the \state price" Dt;t+j = ¯
j(ct+j=ct)
¡¾.
Since we assume a complete asset market, the state price is unique.
17gap between the equipment-skill ratio displays substantial time variations, and becomes larger in
the post-1980 period.
These results suggest that there are interesting interactions between the capital income tax
reform and investment-speci¯c technological change in shaping the dynamics of wage inequal-
ity and skill accumulation. As production of new equipments becomes more e±cient over time,
eliminating capital income taxes would create further incentive for capital accumulation, which,
through equipment-skill complementarity, leads to greater wage inequality and more skill accu-
mulation. The overall e®ects of the tax reform on skill accumulation and the equipment-skill ratio
seem to be large, with an average increase of about 24% in the skilled-unskilled ratio and about
20% in the equipment-skill ratio relative to the pre-reform levels during the period between 1949
and 2000. Since the skilled-unskilled ratio and the equipment-skill ratio drive the skill premium
to opposite directions, the overall e®ect of the tax reform on wage inequality is modest at about
3:3% relative to the benchmark economy.14
Why does eliminating capital income taxes lead to a modest increase in wage inequality and a
substantial rise in the relative quantity of skilled labor? As we have alluded to in the introduction,
the elimination of capital income taxes can a®ect wage inequality and skill formation through three
channels. First, eliminating capital taxes encourages the household to invest in physical capitals
which, through the equipment-skill complementarity, raises the relative marginal productivity of
skilled workers and hence the skill premium. Second, related to the ¯rst, the expectation of a
higher future skill premium provides an incentive for the household to invest in skill accumulation,
which raises the skilled-unskilled ratio and reduces the skill premium. Third, to keep the present
value of tax revenue unchanged, the reduction in capital taxes requires an increase in the labor
income tax rate. Raising the labor income tax lowers the bene¯t of skill accumulation since
skilled labor income is taxed at a higher rate; it also lowers the opportunity cost of time invested
in human capital. However, since goods invested in human capital are not tax deductible, the
higher labor tax reduces only part of the cost of human capital investment. The reduction in total
cost is thus less than the reduction in the bene¯t, and skill accumulation is discouraged (e.g.,
Trostel, 1993). As such, raising the labor income tax tends to increase the skill premium. Under
calibrated parameters, the capital tax reduction leads to a modest increase in wage inequality and
a substantial rise in the relative quantity of skilled labor.
14We have also computed the average di®erences between wage inequality and skill accumulation for the entire
transition period (with 160 years). The average increase in wage inequality associated with the elimination of
capital taxes in this extended sample becomes 1:49% of its pre-reform level, and the average e®ect on the relative
quantity of skilled labor becomes 14:29%.
18Since a zero capital income tax rate is consistent with Ramsey optimal ¯scal policy (e.g.,
Chamley, 1986), one should expect the tax reform to increase social welfare in our model. Indeed,
it does. We measure welfare gains by a consumption equivalence in the spirit of Lucas (1987). In
particular, we de¯ne welfare gains from the reduction of capital income taxes as the permanent
percentage increase in consumption that is required for the representative household to remain
indi®erent between living in two economies: the benchmark economy with positive capital and
labor taxes, and an alternative economy with no capital income taxes but a higher labor income
tax rate. For the period between 1949 and 2000, we ¯nd that the welfare gain from eliminating
capital income taxes is equivalent to a 1:32% permanent increase in consumption. The size
of the welfare gains here is quite close to that obtained by Domeji and Heathcote (2004) in a
representative-agent version of their model (1:5%), and is sizable relative to the welfare cost of
business cycle °uctuations calculated, for example, by Lucas (1987).
Eliminating capital income taxes creates a sizable welfare gain for two reasons. First, it
removes intertemporal distortions in capital accumulation. Second, and more important, it raises
average productivity through encouraging skill accumulation. The ¯rst channel is familiar in the
Ramsey tax literature, but the second is new and is unique to our model with equipment-skill
complementarity and with endogenous skill accumulation.
To examine the robustness of these results, we consider variations in two key parameters: º
and ». The parameter º determines the importance of equipment-skill complementarity (for a
given value of Á), through which investment-speci¯c technological change and tax policies can
a®ect wage inequality. The parameter » measures the returns to scale of the skill transformation
technology: a lower value of » means that transforming unskilled labor into skilled labor is more
costly and thus the e®ects of qt or tax policies on skill accumulation is more muted. As we have
discussed in the calibration section, the empirical literature provides a wide range of estimates for
º and ». Thus, it is important to know to what extent our results depend on the values of these
parameters.
We ¯rst examine the quantitative e®ects of eliminating capital income taxes on wage inequality
and skill accumulation for alternative values of º, while holding » at its benchmark value (0:7).
In addition to our benchmark calibration with º = 0:79, we consider two alternative values of
º used in the literature. One is estimated by KORV (2000), which gives º = 0:401; the other
is estimated by Denny and Fuss (1977), which gives º = 0:65. We do the same counterfactual
experiments of tax reforms using these alternative values of º. The results are reported in Table 3
(Panel A). The table shows that, as º becomes smaller, the e®ects of eliminating capital income
taxes on wage inequality, the skill-unskilled ratio, the equipment-skilled ratio, and welfare become
19more muted. A smaller value of º implies weaker equipment-skill complementarity, so that the
rise in equipment investment induced by the tax reform is associated with a smaller increase in
the skill premium and a weaker incentive for skill accumulation. But for all the values of º that
we have considered here, the tax reform leads to a sizable welfare gain and a modest rise in wage
inequality.
We next examine the e®ects of eliminating capital income taxes for alternative values of », while
holding º at its benchmark value (0:79). Table 3 (Panel B) displays the results. As the value of
» becomes smaller (from 0:8 to 0:5), transforming unskilled labor into skilled labor becomes more
costly. As such, the increase in equipment investment induced by the tax reform leads to a smaller
increase in the skilled-unskilled ratio (from about 29% to about 14%) and a slightly larger increase
in the equipment-skill ratio (from about 20% to about 21%). As the rise in the skilled-unskilled
ratio is dampened (while the rise in the equipment-skill ratio remains roughly unchanged), the
rise in the skill premium is magni¯ed (from 2:28% to 5:26%). As skill accumulation becomes
more costly, the welfare gain from eliminating capital income taxes becomes smaller (from 1:44%
to 1:20%). But even for the lowest value of » that we consider here, the rise in wage inequality
remains modest (at about 5% compared to the benchmark economy) and the welfare gain remains
sizable (at above 1% of consumption equivalence).
To summarize, eliminating capital income taxes can have large e®ects on skill accumulation
and can lead to sizable welfare gains, but it has modest e®ects on wage inequality. This result is
robust to alternative values of key parameters. Our experiment thus suggests that a capital tax
reform such as the one in 1986 is unlikely to be a good candidate for explaining the substantial
rise in wage inequality since the 1980s.
5.2 Counterfactual Experiment II: Policies Designed to Reduce Inequality
We now examine the e®ectiveness of two tax policies, both designed to reduce income inequality.
One such policy is to increase the progressiveness of labor income taxes by imposing a higher
tax rate on skilled labor income (denoted by ¿s) than on unskilled labor income (denoted by
¿u). When we change the labor income taxes, we adjust the capital income taxes so that the
present value of the tax revenues during the entire transition period remains the same as in the
benchmark economy. The other policy is to provide subsidies for human capital accumulation,
while adjusting the labor income tax rate (common to both types of labors) to keep the policy
change revenue neutral.
Table 4 reports the e®ects of increasing the progressiveness of labor income taxes on wage
inequality, skill accumulation, and welfare. The table shows that, when the uniform labor tax in
20the benchmark model with ¿s = ¿u = 27:7% is replaced by a modestly progressive tax system with
¿s = 30:22% and ¿u = 25:18% (so that ¿s=¿u = 1:2 and (¿s + ¿u)=2 = 27:7%), the after-tax skill
premium falls by 2:25%; but the before-tax skill premium, which captures the general equilibrium
e®ect, rises by 4:81%. Following such a policy change, the skilled-unskilled ratio falls by 18:32%
and the welfare is reduced by 1:24% of consumption equivalence. When the progressiveness further
increases, the after-tax skill premium falls by more, but no more than 10:4% even when the tax
rate for skilled labor goes up to twice that for the unskilled. Meanwhile, when ¿s=¿u rises from 1
to 1:6 (i.e., ¿s = 34:09% and ¿u = 21:31%) and then to 2:0 (i.e., ¿s = 36:93% and ¿u = 18:47%),
the before-tax skill premium rises from 0% to 12% and then to 16%; the skilled-unskilled ratio
falls from 0% to ¡44% and then to ¡63%; and the welfare loss rises from 0% to 4:3% and then
to 8:9%. These results suggest that raising the progressiveness of labor income taxes, although
mechanically redistributes income, is not e®ective in reducing wage inequality. Such a policy
discourages skill accumulation and can lead to large welfare losses.
Progressive labor income taxes a®ect the skill premium and skill accumulation through three
channels. First, raising the progressiveness reduces the bene¯t of skill accumulation since the
labor income of skilled workers is taxed at a higher rate. It also raises the opportunity cost of
time invested for skill accumulation since the after-tax wage income for unskilled workers goes
up. Thus, raising the progressiveness discourages skill accumulation, which drives up the skill
premium. Second, holding the capital income tax constant, as the quantity of skilled labor falls
through the ¯rst channel, the equipment-skill ratio should rise, which, through the equipment-skill
complementarity e®ect, tends to drive up the skill premium as well. Third, to keep the policy
change revenue neutral requires raising the capital income tax rate, which discourages physical
capital accumulation, so that the equipment-skill ratio and therefore the skill premium may fall.
As Table 4 shows, the equipment-skill ratio rises slightly for modestly progressive labor taxes (as
the reduction in skilled labor dominates) but falls slightly for large progressiveness (when the
reduction in the stock of capital equipments dominates). Our results reveal that the ¯rst channel
dominates, so that progressive labor taxes lead to large declines in the relative quantity of skilled
labor, large losses in welfare, but not much reduction in (after-tax) wage inequality.
We now consider an alternative policy that, instead of making labor income taxes more pro-
gressive, provides subsidies to human capital investment. Denote the subsidy rate by ¿h. Under
the subsidy policy, the household's budget constraint (7) and the government budget constraint
(6) should be modi¯ed accordingly. In particular, in the household's budget constraint, the term
ih should be replaced by (1 ¡ ¿h)ih; and in the government budget constraint, the expenditure
associated with the subsidy in the amount of ¿hih should be subtracted from the tax revenues.
21To maintain the present value of tax revenues the same as in the benchmark economy without
subsidies, we adjust the labor income tax rate ¿l when we increase the value of ¿h.
Table 5 reports the e®ects of subsidizing human capital accumulation. The table shows that,
as the subsidy rate increases, the skill premium and the equipment-skill ratio both decline, and
the relative quantity of skilled labor and welfare both increase. Even a modest increase in the
subsidy rate, say from 0 (the benchmark economy) to 8%, can result in a sizable reduction in the
skill premium (1:39%), a signi¯cant increase in the relative quantity of skilled labor (5:47%), and a
non-trivial welfare gain (0:30%). Subsidizing human capital investment provides incentive for skill
accumulation, and thereby raises the skilled-unskilled ratio and lowers the equipment-skill ratio,
both of which tend to reduce the skill premium. By raising the relative quantity of skilled labor,
a subsidy leads to more labor-tax revenue for any given labor income tax rate; as such, to keep
revenue neutral, the required labor tax goes down. Thus, a subsidy to human capital counteracts
some of the distortions associated with labor taxes and improves welfare. This result suggests
that subsidizing human capital accumulation does not seem to involve a trade-o® between equity
and e±ciency.
6 Conclusion
Understanding the driving forces of wage inequality is of great interest to both academic re-
searchers and policy makers. In the literature, many potential mechanisms are proposed for
explaining the qualitative changes in wage inequality. Yet, quantitative studies of the relative
importance of these mechanisms are scarce. In the current paper, we have examined the quan-
titative importance of the investment-speci¯c technological change in explaining the dynamics of
wage inequality and skill accumulation in a general equilibrium model. We ¯nd that, working
through equipment-skill complementarity and endogenous skill accumulation, investment-speci¯c
technological change is able to account for much of the observed dynamics in the relative quan-
tity of skilled labor in the postwar U.S. economy, and the model does fairly well in replicating
the substantial rise in wage inequality since the early 1980s. In our counterfactual experiments,
we ¯nd that a revenue-neutral elimination of capital income taxes leads to a modest increase in
wage inequality and a sizable welfare gain. We also ¯nd that a revenue-neutral increase in the
progressiveness of labor income taxes is not e®ective in reducing income inequality and, since it
discourages skill accumulation, can potentially lead to large declines in average productivity and
welfare. In contrast, a policy that provides direct subsidies for human capital accumulation tends
to raise the skilled-unskilled ratio, lower the skill premium, and improve welfare.
22We focus on the role of investment-speci¯c technological change in explaining the dynamic
evolution of wage inequality and skill accumulation mainly because such technological change can
be explicitly measured, thanks to the empirical work by Gordon (1990), GHK (1997), KORV
(2000), and Cummins and Violante (2002). Such technological change turns out to be a quanti-
tatively important mechanism in explaining wage inequality, but we do not claim it is the only
mechanism. Future work should incorporate other mechanisms such as demographic changes (that
a®ect human capital accumulation) or institutional reforms (that a®ect the relative returns to ed-
ucation), and evaluate the quantitative importance of these alternative mechanisms in explaining
the dynamics of wage inequality, especially for the period before 1980.
Another direction to extend our study is to introduce consumer heterogeneity. Since our
focus is on income inequality, we have taken a representative-agent approach, which implicitly
assumes perfect risk-sharing between households. As such, there is no consumption inequality
in our model. Incorporating consumer heterogeneity can be potentially important for evaluating
the quantitative trade-o®s between equity and e±ciency when designing a public policy reform,
such as the counterfactual policy experiments that we have considered in the current paper.
Future work along these lines should help further improve our understanding of the causes and
consequences of income inequality, and is thus both important and promising.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we describe our data sources and computation methods.
Appendix A: Data
Our measure of wage inequality (i.e., skill premium) is the ratio of the mean wage for college
graduates to that for high-school graduates, where the wages are annualized real wages (in 2002
23dollars). To construct the wage data for di®erent education cohorts, we follow Eckstein and
Nagyp¶ al (2004) in selecting our sample. The sample includes data for all full-time, full-year
workers between ages 18 and 65. The main source of the data is the March Current Population
Survey (CPS) from 1962 to 2003. Earlier observations are taken from the 1950 and 1960 Census
data.
Our measure of the relative quantity of skilled workers is the ratio of the number of college
graduates to that of high-school graduates. These time series are taken from Katz and Autor
(1999), who also use the Census and the CPS as their data source. Their sample includes all
workers between ages 18 and 65, and we focus on college graduates and high-school graduates.
Our measure of the expenditure for skill accumulation is the current-fund expenditures and
educational and general expenditures of degree-granting higher education institutions. The source
of the data is National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2003.
Appendix B: Computation
We solve the model by using the following algorithm:
1. Given q1 = 1, we solve the initial steady state. We save the values of initial consumption c1,
equipment ke;1, structure ks;1, skilled labor s1, fraction of time invested in skill accumulation
e1, goods invested in human capital ih;1, in equipment ie;1, and in structure is;1.
2. Given the terminal value of the ISTC series qT, we solve the ¯nal steady state. We save
the values of ¯nal-period consumption cT, equipment ke;T, structure ks;T, skilled labor sT,
fraction of time invested in skill accumulation eT, goods invested in human capital ih;T, in
equipment ie;T, and in structure is;T.
3. Through linear interpolations between the initial steady state and the ¯nal steady state,
we obtain a sequences of each of the eight variables fct;ke;t;ks;t;st;et;ih;t;ie;t;is;tgT
t=1. We
use these sequences as an initial guess for solving the system of non-linear equations, which
consists of equations (3){(5) and (9){(13), together with non-negativity constraints on these
variables. We have 8£T equations in this system. We solve this system of equations using
standard non-linear numerical methods.
4. We make T su±ciently large so that the transition dynamics between 1949{2000 are not
a®ected by small variations in T.
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27Table 1.
Calibrated parameter values
Preference ¾ = 1:5 ¯ = 0:988
Technology µ = 0:13 ¹ = 0:423 ¸ = 0:491 Á = ¡0:495 º = 0:79
Depreciation ±s = 0:056 ±e = 0:124 ´ = 0:08
Skill accumulation B = 0:349 » = 0:70 ® = 0:60
Income tax rates ¿k = 0:397 ¿l = 0:277
28Table 2.
Initial moment conditions
Variable Model Data
Skill premium 1.456 1.456
ih=y 0.018 0.018
Capital-output ratio 2.659 2.659
Capital income share 0.267 0.267
Skilled-unskilled ratio 0.288 0.288
c=y 0.769 0.812
ke=ks 0.558 0.637
29Table 3.
E®ects of eliminating capital income taxes
A. Sensitivity to º
º Skill premium S-U ratio Ke-S ratio Welfare
0.79 (benchmark) 3.28% 23.73% 20.02% 1.32%
0.65 2.05% 14.02% 19.13% 1.10%
0.401 1.03% 6.83% 18.25% 0.97%
B. Sensitivity to »
» Skill premium S-U ratio Ke-S ratio Welfare
0.80 2.28% 29.30% 19.72% 1.44%
0.70 (benchmark) 3.28% 23.73% 20.02% 1.32%
0.60 4.38% 18.29% 20.42% 1.27%
0.50 5.26% 14.23% 20.74% 1.20%
30Table 4.
E®ects of increasing progressiveness of labor income taxes
¿s=¿u Skill premium Skill premium S-U ratio Ke-S ratio Welfare
(after-tax) (pre-tax)
1 (benchmark) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1.2 -2.25% 4.81% -18.32% 0.99% -1.24%
1.4 -4.31% 8.74% -32.48% 0.02% -2.68%
1.6 -6.25% 11.93% -43.77% -1.98% -4.29%
1.8 -8.21% 14.36% -53.57% -6.05% -6.23%
2.0 -10.41% 15.83% -63.07% -13.03% -8.88%
31Table 5.
E®ects of subsidizing human capital investment
¿h Skill premium S-U ratio Ke-S ratio Welfare
0 (benchmark) 0% 0% 0% 0%
0.02 -0.35% 1.28% -0.15% 0.08%
0.04 -0.69% 2.63% -0.29% 0.15%
0.06 -1.04% 4.02% -0.44% 0.23%
0.08 -1.39% 5.47% -0.59% 0.30%
0.10 -1.74% 6.95% -0.74% 0.38%
0.12 -2.10% 8.50% -0.89% 0.45%
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Figure 1:|College wage premium (log units): 1963{2000
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Figure 2:|Relative quantity of college skills: 1963{1996
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Figure 3:|Investment-speci¯c technological change: 1949{2000
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Figure 4:|The skill premium (log units): model vs. data
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Figure 5:|The skilled-unskilled ratio: model vs. data
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Figure 6:|E®ects of capital-tax reform on the skill premium (log units)
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Figure 7:|E®ects of capital-tax reform on the skilled-unskilled ratio (top panel) and on the
equipment-skill ratio (bottom panel, log units)
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